Public Use / Public Purpose: After Kelo v. City of New London by Callies, David
Introduction
One of Professor Kotaka's many interests and legacies in the field of adminis-
trative law was and is his work in the field of compulsory purchase, known as
eminent domain in the United States. It is thus timely and appropriate for this
contribution to deal with this subject, and in particular the issue of the suffi-
ciency of public purpose to support the governmental exercise of its compulsory
purchase powers, about which there has been much recent discussion, caselaw,
and state statutory and constitutional amendment in the United States. This
article commences with a summary of the law of eminent domain in the United
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States, then proceeds to a full discussion of a recent (2005) U.S. Supreme Court
case about public use, and finally the reaction of state legislatures and state
courts to that case.
Generally, any unit of government in the United States－federal, state or lo
cal－can use its sovereign powers to take private land for public use. The same
is true for quasi-governmental agencies and public corporations and utilities.
The limits placed on the exercise of that power are defined in the statutes that
created them.1 The technical term most often used, "eminent domain," does not
imply that a government's right to take such real estate interests is based on a
preeminent sovereign title or prerogative.2 Rather, most authorities agree it is
based on the concept that the power is necessary to fulfill a sovereign govern-
mental function, in the interests of all the people which that government, as a
general purpose government, represents.3 The power is thus based not on ulti-
mate ownership by the state, but on the exercise of its sovereign powers, vested
in the legislature but exercised by the executive branch of government.4
However, to say that eminent domain is a fundamental attribute of sover-
eignty clashes with the concept of individual rights, particularly those to pri-
vate property: if government may take property for a public use, then the
individual has no guarantee that private property is safe from confiscation.
Indeed, there is no such guarantee under the British system of government. The
American solution to the dilemma was to adopt such a guarantee of private
property rights in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides that government shall not take private property except for a
public use and upon payment of just compensation.5 Thus, the U.S. Constitution
limits the exercise of eminent domain by the federal government (public use and
compensation) which is presumed to have such power (though never expressly
granted) which limitation is extended to the states by the Federal Constitu-
tion's 14th Amendment.
The power to initiate the exercise of eminent domain ordinarily resides
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exclusively in the legislature.6 In some cases the legislature itself, by mere enact-
ment of a statute or resolution, affects the taking of certain land or interest in
land for public use.7 In cases where a constitutional provision is self executing
and declares that land can be condemned for certain specified uses, proceedings
to take land for such purposes may be instituted without waiting for authority
from the legislature.8 For example, municipal corporations have no prerogative
right to exercise the power of eminent domain and cannot take land for public
uses unless the power has been conferred on them by the legislature.9 However,
there have been cases where a state constitution authorizes cities to write their
own charters. In such instances, a city may give itself the power of eminent do-
main and provide that it may exercise the power beyond its own limits, without
the aid of any legislative act.10
Both private and public corporations have the right to take property if that
right is delegated to them by the state. Legislatures can create different classes
of corporations that are authorized to use eminent domain.11 Government im-
poses different burdens in the exercise of eminent domain under the same condi-
tions for municipal corporations and private corporations because there is
sufficient difference between them.12
Public Purpose Today
While the definition of public use has not changed significantly in the past
twenty years, public perception of that change has. The federal rule, anticipated
in Berman v. Parker,13 was established in Hawaii Housing Authority ("HHA" )
v. Midkiff14: so long as a public use (redefined as public purpose) is conceivable
and possible, even if it never comes to pass, federal courts will accept it. The U.S.
Supreme Court simply reiterated that rule in the 2005 case of Kelo v. New
London,15 holding that economic revitalization was a sufficient public purpose to
justify the taking of a non-blighted single family home under local eminent
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domain statutes. A number of state courts had established a more stringent test
than the supreme court of Connecticut, (which the Court affirmed in Kelo),
which, of course, the states may do since further protecting property rights be-
yond the minimum under federal law is a matter for the states, as indeed the
Supreme Court noted in Kelo. Nevertheless, the decision set off a firestorm of
criticism, leading to pending legislation in two-thirds of the states to establish
a more strict public purpose test to avoid results such as that in Kelo.
The State of the Federal Law on Public Use Before Kelo : Berman v. Parker and
HHA v. Midkiff
The members of the Court expressed different views on the historical ante-
cedents of public use and how far back to go in deriving an appropriate defini-
tion to apply in Kelo.16
Nevertheless, all (except perhaps Justice Thomas) agree that the most rele-
vant precedents are the decisions of the Court in Berman v. Parker and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff. In both decisions, the Court wrote expansively
about the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
In Berman the Court dealt with the condemnation of a thriving department
store contained in a large parcel condemned by a redevelopment agency for the
statutory (Congressional in this case) purpose of eliminating blight, all in ac-
cordance with a required redevelopment plan.17 Justice Douglas for the majority
commenced by observing famously that a community could decide to be attrac-
tive as well as safe, and that in thus justifying eminent domain to accomplish
these goals, "We deal, in other words ... with the police power," 18 a controversial
joining of the two powers which has affected definitions of public use ever since
by obviating any need for the public to actually use the property condemned so
long as it furthered a public purpose. Indeed, the landowners pointed out that
their land would simply be turned over to another private owner.19 No matter,
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said Douglas:
But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress along
to determine, once the public purpose has been established. The public end
may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government－or so the Congress might con-
clude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting
the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.20
To the landowners' argument that their particular parcel was unblighted and
that therefore its condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment's public purpose
clause, Justice Douglas responded that if experts concluded the area must be
planned as a whole in order to prevent reversion to a slum, so be it.21
Despite this broad language, many conceived the decision to apply largely to
redevelopment projects, and in particularly those which were well-planned in ac-
cordance with clear statutory mandates. Not so after HHA v. Midkiff.
In 1967 the Hawaii State Legislature passed a land reform act the principle
purpose of which was to eliminate a perceived oligopoly in available residential
land which was thought to adversely affect the price and availability of housing
for its citizens.22 Eminent domain was the means chosen to solve the problem.
The act authorized a state agency－the Hawaii Housing Authority－to condemn
the fee simple interest in land which was leased to individual homeowners, for
the purpose of conveying that interest to some other private owner, usually the
existing owner's lessee who owned the house on the land.23 The main target of
the legislation was the Bishop Estate (as it was then known), a charitable trust
created by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a descendent of King Kamehameha
the Great and whose large landholdings she eventually inherited. The Estate
challenged the act's condemnation process as a taking without the public use re-
quired by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment.24 While the Federal District
論 説
(名城 '07) 57－1･2－( 5 ) 492
Court upheld the statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the stat-
ute essentially provided for a "naked" transfer from one private individual to an-
other, and so lacked the requisite public use.25
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
citing Berman for the proposition that once a legislative body had declared a
public purpose, it was not for federal courts to interfere unless that purpose
were "inconceivable" or an "impossibility." 26 The means were irrelevant; this was
simply a mechanism or process to accomplish the legislatively-declared public
purpose. Indeed, it would make no difference, said Justice O'Connor writing for
the Court, if that public purpose never came to pass, so long as the legislature
could reasonably have thought it would when enacting the statute.27 Note
throughout the frequent use of public purpose, instead of public use. These
words would come back to haunt Justice O'Connor in Kelo, as appears below.
Kelo v. City of New London : Midkiff and Berman Followed: A Requiem for Public
Use
The Court in Kelo simply extended the reasoning in Berman and Midkiff to
the economic revitalization condemnations that are increasingly common
throughout urban areas in the United States. Indeed, the majority was singu-
larly unimpressed with extreme uses of eminent domain for the purposes of pro-
viding employment and bettering the local tax base as the parties brought to its
attention: "A parade of horribles is especially unpersuasive in this context since
the Takings Clause largely operates as a conditional limitation permitting the
government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge." 28
The facts in Kelo are straightforward. In order to take advantage of a sub-
stantial private investment in new facilities by Pfizer, Inc., in an economically
depressed area of New London along the Thames River, the City reactivated the
private non-profit New London Development Corporation (NLDC) to assist in
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planning the area's economic development.29 Authorized and aided by grants to-
taling millions of dollars, NLDC held meetings and eventually "finalized an inte-
grated development plan focused on 90 acres in the Fort Trumbull area." 30 The
NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of most of the real estate in the 90-
acre area, but its negotiations with the owners of 15 properties failed.31 When
the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings the landowners filed suit.32
Among them was Susette Kelo, who had lived in the Fort Trumbull area since
1997,33 who made extensive improvements to her house, which she prizes for its
water view,34 and Wilhelmina Dery, who was born in her Fort Trumbull house
in 1918 and has lived there her entire life.35 Although there was no allegation
that any of these properties was blighted or otherwise in poor condition, they
nevertheless condemned with the others "because they happen to be located in
the development area." 36 On these facts, petitioners claimed that the taking of
their property violated the public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment.37 A
trial court agreed as to the parcel containing the Kelo house, but a divided
Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that all of the City's proposed
takings were constitutional.38 Noting that the proposed takings were authorized
by the state's municipal development statute and in particular the taking of
even developed land as part of an economic development project was for a public
use and in the public interest, the court relied on Berman and Midkiff in holding
that such economic development qualified as a public use under both federal and
state constitutions.39 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine
whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic develop-
ment satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 40
The Court commenced its analysis by reiterating that private-private trans-
fers alone are unconstitutional and any pretextual public purposes meant solely
to accomplish such transfers would fail the public use test.41 However, the Court
observed that the governmental taking before it was meant to "revitalize the
local economy by creating temporary and permanent jobs, generating a
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significant increase in tax revenue, encouraging spin-off activities and maximiz-
ing public access to the waterfront" 42 all in accordance with a "carefully con-
sidered" 43 and "carefully formulated" 44 development plan in accordance with a
state statute "that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote
economic development." 45 Therefore, the "record clearly demonstrates that the
development plan was not intended to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any
other private entity." 46 Indeed, the Court was particularly impressed by "the
comprehensive character of the plan [and] the thorough deliberation that pre-
ceded its adoption." 47 Although little in the plan demonstrated any actual use by
the public, the Court observed that it had embraced a broader and more "natu-
ral" interpretation of public use as public purpose at least since the end of the
19th Century and "we have repeatedly and consistently rejected that narrow [use
by the public] test ever since." 48
Next, the Court observed that this broad definition of public use accorded
with its "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field." 49 The Court then discussed its decisions in Berman and Midkiff as demon-
strations of such legislative deference, quoting heavily from the language in
Berman about "'the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.'" 50 The Court concluded that its "jurisprudence has
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording leg-
islatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
takings power." 51
The Court's answer: an unequivocal yes. While the Court noted that "the sov-
ereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring to
another private part B ... it is equally clear that a State may transfer property
from one private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of
the taking." 52 The question, then, is what constitutes sufficient use by the pub-
lic. Three factors appear to be important in reaching the conclusion that
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economic revitalization in New London constitutes such use: a rigorous plan-
ning process, the Court's precedents embodied in Berman and Midkiff, and def-
erence to federalism and state decision making.
The Court steadfastly and bluntly rejected any suggestion that it formulate
a more rigorous test.53 Thus, for example, to require government to show that
public benefits would actually accrue with reasonable certainty or that the im-
plementation of a development plan would actually occur would take the Court
into factual inquiries already rejected earlier in the term when the Court re-
jected the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test for regulatory
takings in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.54 Similarly, the Court declined to
second-guess the city's determinations as to what lands it needed to acquire in
order to effectuate the project.55
Lastly, the Court rejected the invitation by some amici to deal with the appro-
priateness of compensation under the circumstances. While the Court acknowl-
edged the hardships which the condemnations might entail in this case, "... these
questions are not before us in this litigation" even though members of the Court
itself raised the adequacy of compensation during oral argument.56 In a nod to
federalism and states rights, the Court closes by leaving to the states any rem-
edy for such hardships posed by the condemnations in New London: "We empha-
size that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many states already
impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline." 57
Only Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests some small role yet for federal
courts in determining that a particular exercise of eminent domain might fall
short of the required public use requirement: "There may be private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so
acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted
under the Public Use Clause." 58 This is, however, largely a due process argument
rather than a Fifth Amendment argument, and in any event, continued
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Kennedy: "This demanding level of scrutiny is not required simply because the
purpose of the taking is economic development." 59
The Dissents
The argument for a judicial hands-off is not so strong as the Court majority
suggests, however, as the vigorous dissents from Justices O'Connor and
Thomas demonstrate. Particularly strong is the dissent by Justice O'Connor
who wrote the broadly-worded Midkiff opinion for a unanimous Court in 1984.
Observing that the question of what is a public use is a judicial, not a legislative
one,60 Justice O'Connor commences by declaring that if economic development
takings meet the public use requirement, there is no longer any distinction be-
tween private and public use of property, the effect of which is "to delete the
words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."61
But what then of Berman and her own language in Midkiff ? These decisions,
according to O'Connor, were exceptions to the Court's jurisprudence which re-
quired public use to be actual use by the public. The Court, says O'Connor, has
"identified" three categories of public use takings of private property: (1) trans-
fers to public ownership for such as roads, hospitals and military bases; (2)
transfers to private common carriers or utilities for railroads or stadia (both of
which she characterizes as "straightforward and uncontroversial")62 and (3) the
rare "public purpose" case "in certain circumstances and to meet certain exigen-
cies" like the eradication of blight and slums in Berman and the elimination of
oligopoly in Midkiff, where deference to legislative determinations were war-
ranted because the " extraordinary precondemnation use of the targeted prop-
erty inflicted affirmative harm on society." 63 In other words, these were
exceptional circumstances clearly not replicated in New London, and the appli-
cation of this third exceptional category in these circumstances "significantly
expands the meaning of public use." 64 If, as the majority suggests, government
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can take private property and give it to new private users so long as the new use
is predicted to generate some secondary public benefit like increased tax reve-
nues or more jobs, then "for public use" does not exclude any takings.65
Dismissing Justice Kennedy's test as one in which no one but a "stupid staffer"
could fail, Justice O'Connor finds the logic of the Court's decision such that
"Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory." 66 Leaving
any tougher standards designed to limit such possibilities to the states is "an ab-
dication of our responsibility. States play many important functions in our sys-
tem of dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly
the Federal Constitution ... is not among them." 67 She ends with concerns for
those with fewer resources who will suffer in contests over exercises of eminent
domain with those with "disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms ....68"
Justice Thomas raises similar concerns in his dissent, but in considerably
more detail. Picking up on Justice O'Connor's concern for the politically least
powerful and characterizing the Court's deferential standard as "deeply
perverse," 69 Justice Thomas provides several examples indicating that those up-
rooted in even the urban renewal cases were overwhelmingly poor, elderly,
black, or all of the above.70 His disagreement with the Court goes much deeper
than that of Justice O'Connor, however. Reviewing a series of court opinions
and writings from the late 18th Century, Justice Thomas concludes that the
cases cited by the majority for the proposition that public use meant public pur-
pose rather than use by the public in the early years of the republic were exce
ptions－aberrations that varied from the usual rule. Thomas concludes that the
Court's current public use jurisprudence therefore rejects the original meaning
of the public use clause, to which he urges the Court to return, and from which
it has clearly deviated.71
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Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Enacted to Limit Eminent Domain Power
in the Wake of Kelo－The States Rebel: Public Purpose Redux
Legislative Action
More than two years after the United State's Supreme Court's decision in
Kelo, the public concern regarding eminent domain abuse is still going strong.
Grass roots groups such as the Institute for Justice and its property rights
counterpart, the Castle Coalition, have been tracking and encouraging policy
movements at the State and local level.72
Legislators in 47 states have introduced, considered or passed legislation lim-
iting the government's eminent domain powers in instances of private use since
the Court's unpopular decision in June of 2005.73 Forty-one states have enacted
legislation aimed at curbing eminent domain abuse.74 The states that have failed
to pass any degree of eminent domain reform are: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island.75
Iowa, Arizona and New Mexico are the only states whose governors vetoed emi-
nent domain reform, and Iowa is the first to override such a veto.76 Local govern-
ments are also taking measures to protect their homeowners, with more than 70
cities and counties introducing their own bills to restrict the use of eminent do-
main.77
Ballot Measures
Citizens in 12 states voted on measures aimed at curbing eminent domain
abuse. (Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Carolina).
Montana, which was previously scheduled to vote on two constitutional initia-
tives aimed at private property rights and limiting the purposes for which the
government may take private property respectively, did not vote on the ballot
measures as they were both withdrawn by their sponsors.78
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Passed Ballot Measures
Voters in 10 of the 12 states (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina) passed the
ballot measures.79
Arizona's Proposition 207, statutory language proposed through a citizen ini-
tiative in Arizona, was approved by 65 percent of voters.80 The proposition curbs
the legislature's power to exercise eminent domain by making the public use
question one for the judiciary to decide rather than the legislature.81
Interestingly, it mandates that the judicial question of public use be determined
"without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public." 82 This lan-
guage cuts against the current eminent domain case law which defers to legisla-
tive determinations of public use. Before the Supreme Court decided Kelo, HHA
v. Midkiff and Berman v. Parker clearly indicated the Court's preference for leg-
islative deference.
Proposition 207, defines "public use" as meaning any of the following:
1. the possession , occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the general
public, or by public agencies;
2. the use of land for the creation or functioning of utilities;
3. the acquisition of property in its current condition, including the removal
of a structure that is beyond repair or unfit for human habitation of use;
or
4. the acquisition of abandoned property.83
The most contentious portion of the measure, however, provides for compen-
sation if existing rights in property are "reduced by the enactment or applicabil-
ity of any land use law ... and such action reduces the fair market value of the
property[.]" 84
The Arizona ballot measure was criticized as being costly to taxpayers, whose
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tax dollars ultimately go to compensate property owners, and to local communi-
ties and voters, who will no longer be able to decide what type of development is
appropriate for them.85 The measure was labeled a "Trojan horse" and "an as-
sault on reasonable planning." 86
Florida voters approved of a constitutional amendment that would prohibit
the government from taking property for "blight" removal.87 The amendment,
which passed with nearly 70 percent approval, requires a three-fifths vote from
each house of the Florida legislature in order to grant exemptions.88
In Georgia, more than 80 percent of the electorate voted in favor of a constitu-
tional amendment requiring a vote by elected officials any time eminent domain
will be used.89
In a close election, Louisiana citizens voted on September 30, 2006 to limit the
government's ability to take private property through amendments to its state
constitution.90 Louisianans passed measure number five, to restrict purposes for
which government can take land from unwilling property owners, by a 55 per-
cent to 45 percent vote.
Measure number five limited the definition of "public purpose" to the follow-
ing:
1. a general public right to a definite use of the property;
2. continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more of the
following objectives and uses:
a. public buildings in which publicly funded services are administered,
rendered, or provided,
b. roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and lands, and
other public transportation, access, and navigational systems avail-
able to the general public,
c. drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and navigational protection
and reclamation for the benefit of the public generally,
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d. parks, convention centers, museums, historical buildings and recrea-
tional facilities generally open to the public,
e. public utilities for the benefit of the public generally,
f. public ports and public airports to facilitate the transport of goods or
persons in domestic or international commerce;
3. the removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the existing
use or disuse of the property.91
The measure also makes it clear that "[n]either economic development, en-
hancement of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be consid-
ered in determining whether the taking ... is for a public purpose[.]" 92
Michigan voters approved a constitutional amendment that prohibits "the
taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of eco-
nomic development or enhancement of tax revenues." 93 The measure, which re-
ceived 80 percent voter approval, also requires the government prove its
authority to condemn property for blight removal by "clear and convincing evi-
dence." 94
More than 60 percent of Nevada voters approved a constitutional amendment
that would sharply limit the government's exercise of eminent domain.95 Nevada
law, however, requires that a constitutional amendment be passed in two con-
secutive general elections, so voters will need to approve of the measure again in
2008.96
New Hampshire's legislature passed a constitutional amendment earlier this
year that prohibited the government from exercising eminent domain "if the
taking is for the purpose of private development or other private use of the
property." 97 The amendment was subsequently approved of by more than 85 per-
cent of Nevada voters.98
North Dakota, which did have a legislative session this year, passed a consti-
tutional amendment through a citizen initiative that prohibits private use of
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property taken though eminent domain.99 The measure passed with over 65 per-
cent approval.100
Measure 39, proposed through a citizen initiative in Oregon and supported by
65 percent of voters, restricts the use of eminent domain in order to convey
property interests to a private party.101 The measure prohibits any public body
from condemning private property used as a residence, business establishment,
farm or forest operation if it intends to convey any property interest to a pri-
vate party.102 However, conveyance to a private party is allowed where the real
property "constitutes a danger to the health and safety of the community by
reason of contamination, dilapidated structures, or improper or insufficient
water or sanitary facilities[.]" 103
The measure states that "[a] court shall independently determine whether a
taking of property complies with requirements of this section, without defer-
ence to any determination made by the public body." 104 In addition, the measure
provides that costs and reasonable attorney's fees will be awarded to the land-
owner in compensation battles where the verdict in trial exceeds the initial writ-
ten offer submitted by the condemner.105
The measure has been criticized as preventative of condemnation in most cir-
cumstances because land is usually handed over to private developers.106 As such,
the measure will set back economic development in the state.107 Moreover, the
government expects to pay an extra $8 - $17 million a year acquiring state high-
way rights of way, as well as $8 -$13 million a year in city and county property
costs.108 This is because more landowners will go to court, and taxpayers will
have to pick up the tab.109
South Carolina's constitution now specifically prohibits municipalities from
condemning private property for "the purpose or benefit of economic develop-
ment, unless the condemnation is for public use." 110 The constitutional amend-
ment, which passed with more than 85 percent approval, closed a loophole
caused by the state's eminent domain law.111
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Failed Measures
California and Idaho failed to pass constitutional amendments proposed
through citizen initiatives.112 These amendments, however, were viewed as not
curbing the type of eminent domain abuse exemplified in Kelo.113
United States Congress
Although both the House and the Senate have introduced numerous bills at-
tempting to restrict eminent domain abuse since the Supreme Court decided
Kelo, HR 3058 is the only one to actually become law.114 The bill, which became
law on November 30, 2005, made appropriations for the Departments of
Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary,
District of Columbia, and independent agencies for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2006.115 The bill provided that "[n] o funds in this Act may be used
to support any Federal, State, or local projects that seek to use the power of
eminent domain, unless eminent domain is employed only for a public use[.]" 116
The bill further specifically states that "public use shall not be construed to in-
clude economic development that primarily benefits private entities." 117 In addi-
tion, the bill provided that the Government Accountability Office conduct a
study on the nationwide use of eminent domain, including the procedures used
and the results accomplished on a state-by-state basis as well as the impact on
individual property owners and on the affected communities.118 This study has
now been completed, but the lack of centralized or aggregate data on eminent
domain proceedings hampered the GAO's ability to provide a comprehensive
overview.119 HR 5576, the appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2007 for the same
departments, is currently being debated.120 If enacted as presently written, it will
keep the restrictions in HR 3058 in place.
Other bills are more sharply critical of eminent domain abuse, such as the
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Private Property Protection Act of 2005, but it seems like the House and Senate
can never quite agree. That Act, also known as HR 4128, provides that:
No State or political subdivision of a State shall exercise its power of emi-
nent domain, or allow the exercise of such power by any person or entity to
which such power has been delegated, over property to be used for economic
development or over property that is subsequently used for economic devel-
opment, if that State or political subdivision receives Federal economic de-
velopment funds during any fiscal year in which it does so.121
It also prohibits the federal government from condemning property for eco-
nomic development.122 The bill passed the House on November 3, 2005 but was
stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee.123 After failing to bring the bill to a
vote H.R. 4128 was "hotlined" 124 on December 5 in an attempt to pass the legisla-
tion before the 109th Congress adjourned.125 The bill, however, was again put
on hold and the eminent domain reform was effectively killed on the Senate
floor.126
In July 2007, Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2007 was introduced
in the House of Representatives to stop taxpayer funding of eminent domain
abuse.127 This bipartisan bill would deny for two fiscal years economic develop-
ment funds to state and local governments that use eminent domain for private
development.128
Recent Court Decisions
Franco v. Nat'l Capital Revitalization Corp., 2007 WL 2001652 (D.C. App, July
2007).
In this recent case, a development corporation initiated condemnation pro-
ceedings against the owner of a store in an allegedly blighted shopping mall.
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The owner answered that the taking was a private use and that the "public pur-
pose" was a pretext. The Superior Court struck the owner's defenses, holding
that once the legislature has declared that there is a public purpose behind a
taking, defenses claiming otherwise are foreclosed as a matter of law.129
The appellate court declined to read Kelo so broadly.130 Although courts must
play a limited role after Kelo, that case did not address the sufficiency of plead-
ings. "Kelo recognized that there may be situations where a court should not
take at face value what the legislature has said." 131 It is not sufficient for a find-
ing of pretext that a private entity will be doing the redevelopment. On the
other hand, Kelo allows that some alleged public purposes may in fact be pre-
texts. "A reviewing court must focus primarily on benefits the public hopes to
realize from the proposed taking." 132 The case was remanded for further consid-
eration of the pretext defense.
In the matter of 49 WB, LLC v. Village of Haverstraw, 2007 WL 1775976
(N.Y.A.D., June 2007)
In this opinion by the Appellate Division of the State of New York, discussion
of Kelo in the first sentence of the opinion. Kelo has "reshaped, in certain re-
spects, the concept of eminent domain." 133 The court also notes that this case
"may represent one of the earliest post-Kelo litigations in the State of New
York." 134
The City, seeking to "revitalize" its downtown, wants to condemn a certain
building. Neither the building nor the area is blighted in any way. There is some
mention by the City of the purpose of providing affordable housing.
The Court acknowledged that legislative determinations are "well-nigh con-
clusive" and judicial review must be narrow.135 The owner alleged that the pur-
pose here is to benefit the developer. The Court says that the burden on the
owner is high: "that the Village's determination and findings do not rationally
relate to a conceivable public use, benefit, or purpose, or whether it merely
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confers private benefits to third parties." 136
Nevertheless, the Court characterized the public purposes here as "illusory"
and even "pretextual."137 The Court held that the true purpose was to benefit the
developer, and invalidated the taking.138
Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y, June 2007)
This was an action by property owners opposing condemnations for the enor-
mous "Atlantic Yards" sports and mixed-use complex. The defendants moved for
dismissal. The case includes a long discussion of Berman, Midkiff, and a very
long and detailed look at Kelo.
The court rejects the argument made by plaintiffs that the sole purpose of the
development was property transfer to a private party. The court says that the
project may fail in its goals (including affordable housing) but that is irrele-
vant to the matter before court.139 The court says that Kelo didn't define "mere
pretext", but in this case plaintiffs have surely not pled sufficient facts.
The Court cites Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly140 ( ) for the standard that
facts must be pled such that the claim is "plausible" on the face of those facts.
Although this standard hasn't been used in eminent domain cases, the court
finds it appropriate. Under this standard, plaintiffs have failed to make a case.
Centene Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Mint Properties, 2007 WL 1695163 (2007)
The City of Clayton, Missouri, give redevelopment powers, including eminent
domain, to a redevelopment corporation. Mint properties (appellants here) re-
sisted, said that their property was not blighted. The trial court held for the re-
development corporation, which judgment is reversed here.
The majority opinion does not cite Kelo at all, but simply looks to the relevant
statute defining "blight", which requires "social liabilities." Whatever that
means, it wasn't found here.
A concurring opinion mentions that after Kelo the legislature made an effort
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at limiting "blight" designations and eminent domain in general, but in 2006
these efforts were rejected.141 This opinion is more deferential, but feels that
Centene just didn't present enough evidence of "social liability".142 There was also
a dissent, which said that there was sufficient evidence presented to support a
finding of blight.143
Litva v. Village of Richmond, 2007 WL 1976592 (Ohio App. June 2007)
Plaintiffs appeal a decision holding certain ordinances valid and enforceable.
Plaintiffs keep horses and animals on their properties. Citizens of the Village
pass an initiative/ordinance prohibiting the keeping of animals in the village.
Plaintiffs claim a regulatory taking, citing their "drastically" reduced property
value. However, this argument was apparently not made a trial, will not be con-
sidered here. Therefore, the decision is affirmed.
Kelo is cited obliquely in dissent. According to the dissent, the majority seems
to say that if the citizens vote, they can take anyone's property at all.144 The dis-
sent asks is to consider what happened after Kelo, when an attempt was made
by citizens to condemn the home of one of Kelo's majority Justices. "This action,
according to the majority's rationale, would not be a taking." 145
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A. 2d 324
(Feb 2007)
This case, containing a thorough discussion of Kelo, arose from a "quick take"
condemnation of a property containing a bar and "package goods" store. The
circuit court granted the City's condemnation petition, without any notice to
the owner. The owner appealed, prevailed, and the City appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. The City asks: does the city have the burden to prove 'necessity'
to proceed with a quick take condemnation? The answer: yes.
The court finds that the City needs to work harder in quick take proceedings
to show a public purpose.146 Ordinances authorizing the procedure notwith-
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standing, "a government entity must provide some assurance that the urban re-
newal will constitute a public use or public purpose for the property taken. It is
not enough, especially in quick take situations, for the City to simply say that
it is conducting urban renewal and leave it at that." 147 The court makes the point
that the quick take nature of this case is important, and means a higher burden
for the city. But even in a "regular" eminent domain taking, the evidence of pub-
lic purpose here was "sparse".148 O'Connor's Kelo dissent is cited for the notion
that in Midkiff and Berman it was the "extraordinary precondemnation use of
the targeted property" that validated the taking.149
Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the City of Bloomington v. Bloomington
Professional Building, LLC, 2007 WL 224272 (Minn. App., Jan 2007)
An appeal of district court grant of quick take condemnation. A building
owner claimed that the take was unauthorized, that his property was not
"blighted", that the take was not for a public purpose, and was unnecessary. The
take is affirmed here.
There is little discussion of Kelo here, and the case is not a terribly interesting
one. The owner in fact had previously been in negotiations with the City to per-
form the redevelopment, and it was only when those talks broke down that he
opposed the process.150 The court cites Kelo approvingly for the proposition that
economic redevelopment is a valid public purpose.151
MHC Financing Ltd. Part. v. City of San Rafael, 2006 WL 3507937 (N.D. Cal., Dec.
2006)
This case provides a good overview of how Kelo and Lingle152 might work to-
gether in practice. MHC owns a trailer park, and claimed that a rent and va-
cancy control ordinance is a taking, in that it fails to "substantially advance" a
legitimate state interest. Proceedings were suspended pending the decision in
Lingle. After Lingle destroyed the "substantially advance" test in takings
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claims, MHC was permitted to amend its complaint.153 The amended complaint,
covering all bases, alleges a physical taking, a Penn Central regulatory taking,
a private taking, illegal exactions, and substantive due process violations. The
City moved for summary judgment, which the court here grants in part but de-
nies on the regulatory taking, private taking, and substantive due process
claims.154
A through discussion follows of Lingle, and how it may drastically effect 9th
Circuit jurisprudence. The City cites Kelo, and claims that legislative determina-
tions can't be second guessed by the courts. The court here clearly doesn't favor
"premium granting" rent control ordinances.155
Most of the discussion of Kelo is with respect to the private taking claim. The
court cites Justice Kennedy's concurrence that "careful and extensive inquiry
into whether, in fact, the development plan is of primary benefit to the developer
and only incidental benefit of the City" may be required.156 Since such an inquiry
is needed here, summary judgment is denied.157
City of Baltimore Development Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assoc., 395 Md. 299 (Nov.
2006)
A case with only fairly marginal connection to Kelo, the issue here was
whether a corporation invested with condemnation powers is subject to "open
government" standards and regulations. Kelo is briefly summarized, with par-
ticular emphasis on the dissents.158 The court notes that when one is forced
under condemnation to convey property, especially to private parties, it is even
more important that the proceedings be open to public scrutiny.159
Western Seafood Company v. U.S., 202 Fed. Appx. 670 (5th Cir. Oct. 2006)
This case arose from a redevelopment effort, to be built and operated by a pri-
vate company. The owner of some riverfront property to be condemned filed for
injunctive relief against the US Corps of Engineers and the city to prevent them
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from building marina piers in front of their property. The owner claimed that
the taking violated the US and Texas constitutions.160 The City claimed that the
principal purpose was to revitalize the city, a valid purpose.161
The action was initiated before Kelo. After Kelo, Western filed for reconsid-
eration. By this time, Texas has also passed the "Limitations on the Use of
Eminent Domain Act," passed in response to Kelo.162
The court held that the taking does not violate the US Constitution. The court
generally follows Kelo, which it says is "directly on point".163 However, the recent
Act does restrict eminent domain, so this case is remanded for reconsideration
in light of that Act.164
Nevadans for the Protection of Property Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d. 1235
(Nev. Sep, 2006)
This is another case citing Kelo which is not directly about eminent domain.
There had been a citizen's initiative to amend the Nevada constitution to restrict
the powers of eminent domain, and to otherwise strengthen "property rights".165
It was alleged that the proposed amendment violated a statutory limitation on
such amendments to concerns themselves with single issues only. Kelo was rele-
vant only to the extent that it had been admitted that the initiative was
launched in response to that decision.166 As such, the majority felt it appropriate
to judicially trim the proposed amendment to its core issue of restricting emi-
nent domain, to the exclusion of other issues such as regulatory takings.167
Hoffman Family, LLC v. City of Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 634 S.E.2d 722 (Sep.
2006)
The City attempted to condemn land to relocate a storm water sewer, as part
of a redevelopment plan. An owner sued, claiming that the plan was for the
benefit of a private party, the developer. The trial court found that the taking
was for a public use.168
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The court here had little difficulty affirming the finding of public use. "Here,
... the City's proposed use of the condemned property is exclusively a public use
that will function as a part of the City's storm water sewer system." 169
Kelo was cited only in a footnote, where it was found not applicable.170
Condemnation here will not entail any private occupancy of the condemned
property. Also, Kelo was based entirely on the US Const., which was not at issue
here.
Century Land Group, LLC v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Keyport, 2006
WL 2457846 (N.J. Super. L., Aug 2006)
A developer and Keyport signed a Memorandum of Understanding, establish-
ing a "cooperative relationship" regarding the development of a former
landfill.171 The landfill is leaching contamination into surrounding waterways.
There is also a deserted industrial complex. The developer sought to build multi-
family residential buildings. The City labeled the site as in need of "redevelop-
ment," pursuant to statute. The site needed rezoning, and after the developer
and city were unable to agree on density, the developer terminated the MOU.
The City opened the redevelopment to bid, inviting developer to submit a bid.
Developer sued, claiming that the redevelopment designation was arbitrary and
capricious, ultra vires, and illegal.172
The developer cited Kelo for the proposition that "redevelopment designation
cannot be sustained where private development is likely." 173 The court disagreed,
saying that Kelo's broad conception of public purpose rather helps the city
here.174
Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639
(2006).
In one of the first state supreme court decisions issued after Kelo, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that "economic development alone does not
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constitute a public purpose[.]" 175 In that case, Muskogee County brought con-
demnation proceedings against landowners for the purpose of acquiring right-
of-way easements for the placement of three water pipelines, two of which
would solely service Energetix, L.L.C, a private electric generation plant pro-
posed for construction and operation in the County.176 The landowners objected
to the proceedings "primarily on the basis that the takings were not for a valid
public purpose, but rather an unlawful taking of private property for private
purpose." 177 The trial court sided with the County but the appellate court re-
versed, holding that the takings were unlawful because they were for the "direct
benefit of a private company and not for 'public purposes[.]'" 178 The County ap-
pealed.
Agreeing with the appellate court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned:
We adhere to the strict construction of eminent domain statutes in keeping
with our precedent, mindful of the critical importance of the protection of
individual private property rights as recognized by the framers of both the
U.S. Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution. If we were to construe
"public purpose" so broadly as to include economic development within those
terms, then we would effectively abandon a basic limitation on government
power by "wash[ing] out any distinction between private and public use of
property-and thereby effectively delet[ing] the words "for public use" from
[the constitutional provisions limiting governmental power of eminent do-
main.]"179
The court specifically distinguished this case from Kelo:
Contrary to the Connecticut statute applicable in Kelo, which expressly
authorized eminent domain for the purpose of economic development, we
note the absence of such express Oklahoma statutory authority for the
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exercise of eminent domain in furtherance of economic development in the
absence of blight.180
The court explained that its decision was "reached on the basis of Oklahoma's
own special constitutional eminent domain provisions[.]" 181 The court observed
that "[w]hile the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides "nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation," the
Oklahoma Constitution places further restrictions by expressly stating "[n]o
private property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without
compensation." 182 Although the Oklahoma constitution expressly lists excep-
tions for common law easements by necessity and drains for agricultural, min-
ing and sanitary purposes, the proposed purpose of economic development falls
within none of these categories:183
To permit the inclusion of economic development alone in the category of
"public use" or "public purpose" would blur the line between "public" and
"private" so as to render our constitutional limitations on the power of emi-
nent domain a nullity. If property ownership in Oklahoma is to remain
what the framers of our Constitution intended it to be, this we must not
do.184
Accordingly, the court held that "economic development alone does not consti-
tute a public purpose and therefore, does not constitutionally justify the
County's exercise of eminent domain." 185
Burien v. Strobel Family Investments, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1136 (June 12,
2006) UNPUBLISHED OPINION, review denied by Washington Supreme Court,
149 P. 3d 378 (Wash. 2006).
The Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed a trial court decision holding
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that the City's exercise of eminent domain to condemn a restaurant for a new
"Town Square" development was not arbitrary or capricious.186 The decision
makes no mention of Kelo or the recent public use versus public purpose debate.
The court simply applied Washington's three-part test in evaluating eminent
domain:
For a proposed condemnation to be lawful, the condemning authority must
prove that (1) the use is really public, (2) the public interest requires it, and
(3) the property appropriated is necessary for that purpose.187
The landowner challenged whether the condemnation is "necessary," specifi-
cally arguing that the City might turn around and sell a portion of the property
to a private developer, which would benefit that private entity and not the
City.188 The court pointed out, however, that the City Council specifically set
forth and determined that the property would be used only for public streets,
public parks, or public parking.189 Moreover, the court explained that "[w]here
property is taken, ... with the intention of using it for a certain purpose speci-
fied in the ordinance authorizing the taking, as was done in this case, the city,
doubtless, has the authority to change said contemplated use to another and
entirely different use, whensoever the needs and requirements of the city sug-
gest." 190 In holding that the city council's determination that the property was
"reasonably necessary and required" for the development, the court reasoned:
When it comes to such discretionary details as the particular land chosen,
the amount of land needed, or the kinds of legal interests in that land that
are necessary for the project, many Washington decisions have said that the
condemnor's judgment on these matters will be overturned only if there is
proof of actual fraud or such arbitrary and capricious conduct as would
amount to constructive fraud.
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Given the absence of actual or constructive fraud, the court held that the
City's determination to condemn the entire property was necessary to facilitate
a public use.
City of Norwood v. Horney, 2006 Ohio LEXIS 2170 (July 26, 2006).
The Ohio Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to accept an emi-
nent domain case after Kelo.191 In City of Norwood v. Horney, Ohio Supreme
Court unanimously held, that "an economic or financial benefit alone is insuffi-
cient to satisfy the public-use requirement of [the Ohio Constitution]." 192 In this
case, the City of Norwood entered into a contract with Rookwood Partners Ltd.,
("Rookwood") in order to redevelop the plaintiffs' neighborhood.193 When
Rookwood could not negotiate the sales of certain properties the City initiated
condemnation proceedings.194 Pursuant to the City code, an urban-renewal study
was completed before the City instituted the eminent domain proceedings.195 The
study concluded that the neighborhood was a "deteriorating area" as that term
is defined in the Norwood Code.196 At trial, the court found that the study "con-
tained numerous errors and flaw" and the City's planning director testified only
that the neighborhood "probably would" deteriorate or was in danger of deterio-
rating or becoming a blighted area.197 In light of this evidence, the trial court
found that the City abused its discretion insofar as it had found that the neigh-
borhood was a "slum, blighted or deteriorated area."198 The court concluded,
however, that the City did not abuse its discretion in finding that the neighbor-
hood was a "deteriorating area." 199 The landowners appealed.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically de-
clined to hold "economic benefits alone to be a sufficient public use for a valid
taking." 200 The court found that analysis by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock201 and the dissenting judges of the Supreme Court
of Connecticut and the dissenting justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo, are
"better models" for interpreting the Ohio Constitution.202 In applying the
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analysis therefrom, the court held that "an economic or financial benefit alone
is insufficient to satisfy the public-use requirement in the Ohio Constitution. In
light of that holding, any taking based solely on financial gain is void as a mat-
ter of law and the courts owe no deference to a legislative finding that the pro-
posed taking will provide financial benefit to a community." 203 The court
explained that "[a]lthough economic benefit can be considered as a factor
among others in determining whether there is a sufficient public use and benefit
in a taking, it cannot serve as the sole basis for finding such benefit."204
Next, the court turned to the City's eminent domain statute. The court deter-
mined that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes that regulate the
use of eminent-domain powers and that courts should apply "heightened scru-
tiny" when reviewing such statutes.205 The court held that the use of the term
"deteriorating area" as a standard for determining whether private property is
subject to appropriation was "void for vagueness and offends due process rights
because it fails to afford a property owner fair notice and invites subjective in-
terpretation." 206 The court found that "deteriorating area" was a "standardless
standard" and that the City code "merely recites a host of subjective factors that
invite ad hoc and selective enforcement." 207 The court further held that in any
event the term could not be used as a standard for a taking because it "inher-
ently incorporates speculation as to the future condition of the property into the
decision ... rather than focusing that inquiry on the property's condition at the
time of the proposed taking." 208 The court reasoned that "[s]uch a speculative
standard is inappropriate in the context of eminent domain, even under the
modern, broad interpretation of 'public use.'" 209 Moreover, "[a] municipality has
no authority to appropriate private property for only a contemplated or specu-
lative use in the future." 210
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Talley v. Housing Authority of Columbus, Georgia, 630 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006):
The Court of Appeals of Georgia took the Supreme Court's reasoning in Kelo
to heart holding that the state's Urban Redevelopment Law ("URL") allowed
property to be condemned for transfer to a private party.211 In Talley, the
Housing Authority of Columbus, Georgia ("HACG") instituted condemnation
proceedings against a subdivision lot and its owners.212 The HACG paid $17,500
for the property in 1994.213 Five years later, the HACG sold the same property to
a private citizen for $42,800.214 In 2003, Logie Talley, one of the former lot own-
ers, instituted a pro se action claiming that the HACG unlawfully took his prop-
erty and demanded its return.215 Talley further argued that HACG abandoned
all public use of the property in 1999 when it sold it to a private citizen.216 The
trial court granted summary judgment to the HACG without explanation.217
On appeal, the court held that the challenge to the legality of the 1994 taking
was barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel due to the con-
demnation proceedings that took place that year.218 Talley's claim regarding
public use, however, was appropriate for consideration.219 The court first looked
at the URL:
Enacted in 1955, the URL authorizes Georgia municipalities and counties,
either directly or through urban redevelopment agencies or housing autho-
rities, to exercise the power of eminent domain for the acquisition and rede-
velopment of urban property which has been found to be a "slum area" as
defined in the URL. To effectuate redevelopment of condemned property,
the URL authorizes a housing authority to sell, lease or otherwise transfer
condemned property "for public use"; or for various specified private uses,
i.e., "residential, recreational, commercial, industrial"; or for "other uses."220
The court then turned to Kelo for guidance and reiterated the Supreme
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Court's reasoning that such takings are permissible under the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, and it is left up to the states to enact
more restrictive condemnation laws if they so choose.221 The court observed that
"Georgia's nonrestrictive URL and its underlying constitutional authorization
remain in place. Therefore, the HACG was entitled to summary judgment on
Talley's complaint that it abandoned any 'public use' of the property [upon sale]
to a private citizen for 'other uses,' as such disposition of condemned property is
authorized by the URL." 222
Rhode Island Economic Development Corp., v. The Parking Company, L.P., 892
A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006):
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also took a que from Kelo, when it stressed
the importance of good faith and due diligence in determining public use. In
Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation ("RIEDC") v. The Parking
Company, Limited Partnership ("TPC"), the RIEDC Board condemned a tempo-
rary easement over a parking garage for the duration of the term of the lease
TPC held for the garage.223 TPC was not informed of the hearing and the trial
court, satisfied with the amount of compensation offered, found in favor of
RIEDC.224 Upon notice of the order, TPC appealed averring, inter alia, that the
taking was not for a public use.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with TPC and held that the RIEDC
"failed to satisfy the public use requirement of the Takings Clause." 225 The court
explained that:
The United States Supreme Court's recent holding in [Kelo], while uphold-
ing a taking for economic development purposes, stressed the condemning
authority's responsibility of good faith and due diligence before it may
start its condemnation engine. In determining whether an economic devel-
opment project qualifies as a public use, under the Takings Clause, the
Public Use / Public Purpose After
57－1･2－ (名城 '07)
Kelo v. City of New London
( 32 )465
Supreme Court focused on the City of New London's deliberative and me-
thodical approach to formulating its economic development plan.226
With this in mind, the court noted the "stark contrast" between the "exhaus-
tive preparatory efforts" that the NLDC took in Kelo, and the RIEDC's approach
in this case by using the state's quick-take statute.227 The court concluded that
condemnation was inappropriately "motivated by a desire for increased revenue
and was not undertaken for legitimate public purpose." 228
Didden v. Villiage of Port Chester, 173 Fed. App. 931 (2d Cir. 2006)
UNPUBLISHED OPINION, cert denied 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1036 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007):
Recently, the Supreme Court declined to hear an eminent domain extortion
case. In Didden, a dispute arose between private developers over a development
project.229 In 1999, the Village of Port Chester authorized a land disposition
agreement with G&S Port Chester, LLC ("G&S") for a redevelopment project.230
The agreement covered the use of eminent domain incidental to the implementa-
tion of the project and the Port Chester Board of Trustees found that there was
a legitimate public purpose for condemnation.231 Plaintiffs claim that Gregory
Wasser, the principle of G&S, demanded that they pay him the sum of $800,000
or give him a partnership interest in their project, or else he would cause Port
Chester to condemn their properties and thereby divest Plaintiffs of title at a
meeting in 2003.232 Plaintiff's refused and their property was condemned pursu-
ant to the agreement G&S had with Port Chester. Plaintiff's challenged the pro-
ceedings but their claims were deemed time-barred by the three-year statute of
limitations due to the fact that they had notice in 1999 of the likelihood of con-
demnation proceedings against them.233 Plaintiff's appealed.
The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court regarding the time bar but
went on to explain that the Plaintiff's would not have a claim even if the statute
of limitation had not run. On appeal, the Plaintiffs claimed that Wasser's threat
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to condemn their property unless Plaintiffs gave him either $800,000 or a part-
nership interest in the business on the property amounts to an unconstitutional
exaction.234 The court, however, held that "no exaction has occurred here" be-
cause the Plaintiffs did not have any conditions placed upon their property dur-
ing their ownership that limited their ability to use their property.235
Moreover, the court held that the Plaintiff's allegation of an extortionate de-
mand of $800,000 to avoid condemnation added nothing of legal significance to
their claims.236 G&S and Wasser have the authority under the agreement to ob-
ligate Port Chester to pursue condemnation of properties within the project's
boundaries.237 As such, threats to enforce their legal rights are not actionable.238
Therefore, even if Wasser did request payment in exchange for relinquishing the
legal right to request condemnation, Plaintiffs have no recourse.239 The court ob-
served that the New York Eminent Domain Procedure Law "does not require the
condemner to negotiate with a private property owner in good faith prior to
seeking to acquire title to the property." The Plaintiff's appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court but cert was denied in January 2007.
A Requiem for Public Use
There was very little left of the public use clause－at least in federal court－
even before the Kelo decision. While a growing handful of state (and federal de-
cisions applying state law on property) decisions found economic revitalization
public purposes invalid on constitutional grounds,240 an equal number of deci-
sions agreed with the Connecticut Supreme Court that this was a valid public
use. Clearly this is the view of hundreds of state and local revitalization and re-
development agencies.241 Whether one reads the Court's previous jurisprudence
on public use broadly, as Justice Stevens does for the Court's majority, or more
narrowly, as does the dissent, it is difficult to argue with the conclusions
reached separately by Justices O'Connor and Thomas: the public use clause is
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virtually eliminated in federal court. What yellow light of caution the handful
of recent cases signaled has now turned back to green, and government may
once more acquire private property by eminent domain on the slightest of public
purpose pretexts unless such a use is inconceivable or involves an impossibility,
the tests following Midkiff in 1984. In other words, it's now all about process,
and process only. There is no doubt that state and local governments will do
much good in terms of public welfare and public benefits flowing from economic
revitalization under such a relaxed standard, as they have often done in the
past. They will do so with increased attention to carefully-drafted plans and
procedures guaranteeing maximum public exposure and participation, both em-
phasized in the majority opinion. Moreover, members of the Court during oral
argument suggested rethinking how to calculate and award "just" compensation
in extenuating circumstances such as those in New London now that the public
use clause is a mere procedural hurdle. And yet, the public use clause is more
than simple policy; it is a bedrock principle contained in the Bill of Rights
amendments to our Federal Constitution, designed not to further the goals and
desires of the majority, but as a shield against majoritarian excesses at the ex-
pense of an otherwise defenseless minority－like the Kelos. Surely we could have
found grounds to preserve that shield in federal court.242

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